![]() Perry: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.īeater, G.: 1982, Quality and Concept, Clarendon Press, Oxford.īennett, J.: 1988, Events and their Names, Hackett Pub. Warnock (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 1979, pp. L.: 1961, ‘Unfair to Facts’, in Philosophical Papers, 3d ed., J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 24, reprinted in Philosophical Papers, 3d ed., J. L.: 1950, ‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. M.: 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Īustin, J. Barnes (ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.Īrmstrong, D. ![]() P.: 1996, A Realist Conception of Truth, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.Īristotle: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, J. ![]() This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.Īlston, W. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. A theory with this structure will give at least some unity to the general notion of truth. The derived notions have to be explained in terms of the primary notion together with certain relations that hold between the basic truth bearers, on the one hand, and the non-basic truth bearers on the other. The primary notion has to be explained in terms of some feature that does not itself contain any notion of truth. One way to achieve this is by selecting a category of basic truth bearers and taking the associated subnotion of truth as primary, while treating the others as derived. Still, the over-all theory will aim to show that the general notion of truth is not just a bare disjunction it will aim to show that the subnotions are all tied (each in its own manner) to a single explanatory ground. Here the general notion of truth is partitioned into four subnotions, sentence-truth, statement-truth, belief-truth, and proposition-truth, each of which will have to be given its own account. Instead, a general theory of truth will have to take the form of a disjunction: x is true just in case x is either a true sentence or a true statement or a true belief or a true proposition. It seems unlikely that a single feature could account for ‘x is true’ with ‘x’ ranging over truth bearers of arbitrary type. The significant differences among these four categories are responsible for a considerable amount of complexity in the theory of truth. ![]() But what kind of “something” is at issue here? What are the bearers of truth and falsehood? Philosophical discussions of truth tend to revolve around four broad categories of truth bearers: sentences (utterances), statements (assertions), beliefs (judgments, thoughts), and propositions. Even in the mind of a single subject, consistency of beliefs is more demanding than coherence, but neither is very likely.Ĭoherence and consistency are best understood as desirable conditions for any theory of truth, including the correspondence theory of truth.A theory of truth is supposed to tell us what it is for something to be true or false. In a system of belief as large as the culture of a society, there are many conflicting beliefs. But consistency is only possible for relatively modest logical and mathematical systems. The coherence theory is close to the consistency theory of truth. In this case, coherence is one way to justify a belief. In traditional epistemology, the coherence may be internal to a personal set of beliefs that are accessible to a subject. In analytic language philosophy, the truth of a proposition depends on its agreement with some larger set of propositions, ideally all known true propositions and any logical inferences from those propositions. Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of pragmatic truth is the coherent inter-subjective agreement of an open community of inquirers. Perfect coherence is not to be expected, of course. In scientific theories, every new observational fact must be integrated with existing facts to make them maximally coherent. In philosophies of idealism, all the ideas or beliefs are said to cohere with one another, perhaps because the world is reason itself or created by a rational agent. Adolphe Quételet Jürgen Renn Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle Tilman Sauerīiosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James SymposiumĪ coherence theory bases the truth of a belief on the degree to which it coheres ("hangs together") with all the other beliefs in a system of beliefs (typically one person's beliefs, but it could be any body of knowledge).
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